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A NEW QKD PROTOCOL BASED UPON 
AUTHENTICATION BY EPR ENTANGLEMENT STATE 
ABSTRACT 
Cryptographic world has faced multiple challenges that are included in encoding 
and decoding transmitting information into a secure communication channel. Quantum 
cryptography may be another generation of the cryptography world, which is based on the 
law of physics. After decades of using the classical cryptography, there is an essential 
need to move a step forward through the most trusted systems, especially enormous 
amount of data flows through billions of communicating channels (e.g. The internet), and 
keeping this transmitting information away from eavesdropping is obligatory. Moreover, 
quantum cryptography has proved its standing against many weaknesses in the classical 
cryptography. One of these weaknesses is the ability to copy any type of information using 
a passive attack without an interruption, which is impossible in the quantum system. 
 Theoretically, several quantum observables are utilized to diagnose an action of 
one particle. These observables are included in measuring mass, movement, speed, etc. 
The polarization of one photon occurs normally and randomly in the space. Any 
interruption that happens during sending of a light will cause a deconstruction of the light 
polarization. Therefore, particles’ movement in a three-dimensional space is supported by 
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Non-Cloning theory that makes eavesdroppers unable to interrupt a communication 
system. In case an eavesdropper tried to interrupt a photon, the photon will be destroyed 
after passing the photon into a quantum detector or any measurement device. In the last 
decades, many Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols have been created to initiate 
a secret key during encoding and decoding transmitted data operations. Some of these 
protocols were proven un-secure based on the quantum attacks that were released early. 
Even though the power of physics is still active and the Non-Cloning theory is unbroken, 
some QKD protocols failed during the security measurements. The main reason of the 
failure is based on the inability to provide the authentication between the end users during 
the quantum and classical channels.  
The proposed QKD protocol was designed to utilize some advantages of quantum 
physics as well as solid functions that are used in the classical cryptography. The 
authentication is a requirement during different communication channels, where both 
legitimate parties must confirm their identities before starting to submit data (plain-text). 
Moreover, the protocol uses most needed scenarios to finish the communication without 
leaking important data. These scenarios have been approved in existing QKD protocols 
either by classical or quantum systems. The matrix techniques also are used as a part of 
the preparation of the authentication key, where the end users communicate by an EPR 
(related to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen theory in 1935) channel. The EPR channel will 
be supported by an entanglement of particles. If the EPR communication succeeded, 
transferring the converted plain-text is required. Finally, both end users will have an 
authenticated secret key, and the submission will be done without any interruption.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Theoretically, cryptography is considered as the art of producing a code, where 
encoding and decoding a plaintext by a secret key are the main process of security 
operation. Cryptography has existed for a long time, and encoding and decoding messages 
were just used by the military communications or as a high secure connection between 
countries. After spreading out the communication technologies and sharing secure 
information between legitimate parties, the cryptography became the main goal in many 
experimental labs and institutions.  
 Several cryptographic algorithms were released based on the requirements of each 
generation technology. The classical cryptography depends on different methods that have 
utilized digits or binary numbers. Moreover, there are many of these methods such as, 
Symmetric Key Encryption (Private-Key), Asymmetric Key Encryption (Public-Key), and 
RSA that are already compromised and have become mostly un-secure. More precisely, 
these security methods are not fully matched with the existing high technology. 
 According to several studies, there are many weak points that have been released 
in the classical cryptography. Most of the used security algorithms have been totally broken 
because their security functions are not able to stand against professional attacks.  Even 
though there are huge weaknesses in the classical cryptography, there are still many 
systems running over a secure platform such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and Elliptic curve 
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public key cryptosystems. These algorithms are stable to secure some platforms as long as 
there is no a quantum computer. 
 Scientists and cryptanalysis are concerned about the first quantum computers that 
were released recently by governmental and educational foundations. This computer has a 
powerful system that can exceed any regular computer. Moreover, the quantum computer 
will be used not only in processing valuable work, but it might be in illegal usages as 
hacking information systems. To recover the existing classical system before releasing 
quantum computers publicly, code makers and security scientists have begun to invent 
another security alternative to stand against any prospective attacks.   
 Furthermore, the classical cryptography as well as the quantum cryptography will 
be clearly discussed in this section. It also will demonstrate common features that have 
been included into the classical and quantum systems. Therefore, this section will describe 
generally the comparisons between both available security systems and in advance 
recommend some used advantages.   
1.1 Classical Cryptography 
Classical cryptography is a technique of repetition processes that is based upon 
complicated mathematic computing functions. These functions define in percentage, how 
the operation is hard to solve or guess from the first attempts. Moreover, the efficient 
definition for the cryptographic methods is well-known by measuring the strength of the 
shared key. This key is usually kept secure between the legitimate communicating parties, 
which is used for only one time of communication cycle. Furthermore, the encryption 
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scheme between at least two parties is to enable both participants sending and receiving a 
message without any gain of the significant information by eavesdroppers. 
1.1.1 Symmetric Encryption 
Symmetric cryptography (Private-key) is a part of the cryptosystem that is based 
on performing sequential encryption and decryption operations by using the same secret 
key. The whole symmetric process is carried out by transforming the plaintext into cipher-
text, and then using the same algorithm to recover the plaintext [1, 2]. The symmetric 
encryption phase includes specific parameters such as the plaintext, encryption algorithm, 
secret key, cipher-text, and decryption algorithm. To ensure the communication is initiated 
under a secure mode, the encryption algorithm must be robust enough since the opponent 
cannot release the used mechanism in the encryption algorithm. 
 
Figure 1. The simple model of the classical cryptography mechanism of submitting a plaintext X 
into an algorithm S. 
Furthermore, the common employed characters in the symmetric cryptography 
involve the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) as well as the eavesdropper (Eve).  Also, 
the legitimate end users (Alice and Bob) should share only one key, whereby the encryption 
and decryption of the submitted plaintext are confirmed by the created secret key [3]. The 
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main thought of the symmetric cryptography is considered about the ability of making a 
robust secret key as long as the opponent is unable to figure out the plaintext. Realizing the 
encryption algorithm or the cipher-text by the opponent does not mean knowing what 
inside the cipher-text or even the plaintext as long as the secret key is unknown. Functions 
(1, 2) show the encryption and decryption scheme of submitted plaintext between two 
parties:  
 𝐶𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟 − 𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 =  𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐾𝑒𝑦, 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛 − 𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡) (1) 
 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛 − 𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 =  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐾𝑒𝑦, 𝐶𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟 − 𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡) (2) 
   
Therefore, both legitimate parties, Alice and Bob should utilize the same secret key, 
either into the encryption or decryption process. One of the most famous symmetric 
algorithms is One-Time-Pad (OTP) algorithm. The OTP encryption technique was 
invented by Frank Miller in 1882 and then improved during several decades [4]. Generally, 
the OTP encryption contains the original plaintext, as well as a random generating code. 
The random code is supposed to have the same length of the original plaintext and should 
be randomly generated. The XOR operation will be applied between the plaintext and the 
random code to initiate the cipher-text that will be transferred into communication 
channels. Both the sender and the receiver should share the secret code to be able to convert 
the cipher text to the original plaintext.    
1.1.2 Asymmetric Encryption 
Asymmetric encryption (Public-key encryption) is based upon employing a public 
key during the communication between Alice and Bob. Asymmetric cryptography is 
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essentially encrypting and decrypting a submitted message by two keys, a public key and 
private key. Transferring a message from Alice to Bob is performed by one of the 
mentioned keys separately either a public or a private key, and vice versa.   One of the most 
widely used public-key cryptosystem is RSA. The RSA was invented by Ron Rivest, Adi 
Shamir, and Len Adleman in 1977, where the RSA derives its complicity from factoring a 
large number [5]. This number will produce large prime numbers that can be easily 
multiplied, but it cannot be determined the original prime numbers. 
Later, several asymmetric encryption algorithms are used in different platforms. 
Moreover, those algorithms are based upon the complexity of mathematical calculations 
and two shared keys. Basically, the process of any Public-key encryption algorithm can be 
explained as follows: 
 𝐷𝑃(𝐸𝑆(𝑀)) = 𝑀, 
 
(3) 
 𝐸𝑆(𝐷𝑃(𝑀) = 𝑀, 
 
(4) 
where E and D, are encryption and decryption processes.  M is the plain text that 
should be sent by a legitimate sender and received by a legitimate receiver. Also, S and P 
represent sequentially private and public keys. 
1.2 Quantum Cryptography 
Quantum Cryptography (QC) was invented by Stephen Wiesner [6] in the early 
1970’s. He started with using the conjugate of state in a linear vector, which is a tool that 
was used to support the QC. The QC assists the existing systems to improve the key 
exchange in the cryptography field. Quantum mechanics properties are consumed to offer 
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an unconditional new theoretical system. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is the 
mechanism of creating a secret (shared) key between legitimate communicating parties in 
the quantum system. Moreover, the quantum communication prevents any eavesdropping 
by a third party (Eve), which is guaranteed by the Non-Cloning theory [7, 8].  
Based on the emergence of using online transactions, sharing information, shopping 
online, and bank accounts, there is a high priority service that should be available with 
those needs. This service should be processed through a secure system without any 
interruption [9, 10]. Quantum key distribution offers this service, where quantum 
mechanics features are applied. In the QKD, two parties (Alice and Bob) obtain quantum 
states and then measure these quantum states. They communicate (all communication from 
this point onwards is classical) to determine the measurement results. These results can 
lead to initiate secret key bits, where some of these bits are discarded in a process so-called 
the sifting phase because the measurement settings were incompatible.  
Furthermore, the communicating parties perform an error correction phase and then 
estimate security parameters, which describe the amount of information that might have 
been leaked by an eavesdropper. If the amount of information is above a certain threshold 
(a percentage of uncovered qubits), they will abort the communication as long as they 
cannot guarantee any secrecy whatsoever. On the other hand, they can apply privacy 
amplification to squeeze out any remaining information that affected by eavesdropper 
during exchanging the shared secret key if the unmatched information is below the 
threshold. Some of these classical communications must be authenticated to avoid the Man-
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In-the-Middle attacks. Moreover, some portions of the utilized protocols can fail with 
negligible probability [11] [12]. 
1.3 Research Problem and Scope 
The common implemented quantum key distribution protocols are mostly 
employing the classical communication as a second phase of the communicating channels. 
The reason behind using the classical channel is considered in two main points. First, 
during the quantum communications, there will be some different noises that would occur 
by the environment or an eavesdropper. These noises should reflect some errors on the 
submitted data. Moreover, Alice and Bob are supposed to correct this data into another 
channel (classical channel). Second, the exchanged data (qubits) during the classical 
channel communication is used to improve the qubits that are already sent and received by 
the end users. Also, using the classical channel in most QKD Protocols provides an 
authentication for the sender and receiver identities. This improvement varies from a 
protocol to another based upon the style, the mechanism of reconciliation, and correcting 
data.  
The main issue that faces the existing QKD protocols is surrounded by improving 
the authentication between the legitimate communicators. Furthermore, most of the QKD 
protocols utilize heavy communications through the classical channel that will certainly 
cause a high chance of different attacks. Therefore, the security of each protocol will be 
failed by two factors. One of these factors is the Runtime-Execution, where the protocol 
will spend extra time to recover the errors during the quantum channels. Second factor, 
eavesdroppers can use the classical data to realize at least some of the needed information. 
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Moreover, the legitimate communicators will be unable to detect any attack because a 
heavy information traffic will be initiated between the sender and receiver. Thus, the 
simplicity of the authentication for the communicating parties is the main point in this 
research as well as the robustness of the proposed scheme. 
1.4 Motivation behind the Research  
There are several related studies that explain cryptography methods in different 
mechanism. Our research illustrates a mechanism of cryptography that is based on previous 
physics and computer science theories as well as providing an authentication. These 
motivations are explained as follows: 
• The new scheme of the proposed algorithm was designed to stand against many 
weak points that have been seen in the QKD Protocols (Literature reviews), and 
the proposed protocol should treat the used mechanism in the most well-known 
protocols. 
• The proposed QKD protocol utilizes two quantum communication channels, and 
there is no classical channel into quantum exchanges unlike other well-known 
QKD protocols. 
• The core of the proposed scheme is based on the power of matrix techniques, which 
the preparation of qubits occurs through a huge matrix (or matrices), and the 
communicating parties use indices of the matrix to build the authentication phase.  
• Correcting errors is built in the quantum system, unlike common QKD protocols 
where the error correction is initiated in a classical channel. 
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• The proposed protocol resists most popular quantum attacks such as the Man-In-
Middle (MIMA) attacks [13], Intercept-Resend (IR) attacks [14, 15], and so on.  
• The main advantage of the proposed protocol is approving the authentication 
between the communicators before exchanging any qubits (plain-text), where they 
begin submitting the content of the secret key into quantum channel. 
1.5 Potential Contributions of the Proposed Research 
The proposed scheme will assist the researchers to improve the quantum 
cryptography system, where the scheme will be applied in the classical system with 
quantum devices. Moreover, the proposed protocol uses a novel technique, which includes 
fulfilling the authentication between the communicating parties before submitting any 
valuable information. There is also no wasted time that usually happens when the whole 
submission fails. On the other hand, the most previous QKD protocols uses a classical 
channel without any authentication procedure. The novelty of the proposed protocol came 
from combining the physics theories with solid computer science fundamentals. The EPR 
Pair Paradox theory is one of the quantum physics facts, where Albert Einstein alongside 
his colleagues Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen were invented in 1935. The main idea of 
the EPR Pair Paradox is explained as a single photon in two different states. This theory 
has been experimented in physics labs, and the conclusion shows the EPR (entangled) state 
has fastness of initiation and termination. Furthermore, the proposed protocol considered 
these advantages to be utilized during the authentication phase. 
In addition, the proposed QKD protocol uses a new algorithm that uses different 
mechanisms compared with the studied QKD protocols. This algorithm executes a huge 
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data to create a secret key. The whole secret key that is created by the proposed scheme 
will be provided without any errors. The proposed QKD protocol also has approved the 
possibility of using the EPR theory within authentication processes. Moreover, using the 
EPR theory; especially during authentication request, will provide a quick connection 
between the legitimate parties before exchanging any data. Furthermore, the proposed 
protocol utilizes quantum theories that have been approved as stable theories. For instance, 
an entangled state creates particles in certain state, where these particles should be read and 
measured by a two-dimensional space vectors from the EPR source. Using entangled states 
should be in limited communications, because these states have ability to stay alive in a 
short time as well as sensitivity of EPR states.  
Furthermore, combining between the physics theories and the mathematical 
functions encourages researchers to improve the existing algorithms and security 
applications, so that the classical system can use some of the quantum devices. More 
precisely, improving the classical system to a quantum system requires partially 
improvement, where the classical system can use some gates or algorithms based on the 
quantum theories. Meanwhile, using a hybrid system (classical and quantum) may help to 
improve the next generation of technology better than using a classical system or jumping 
to whole quantum system in one time. Additionally, the proposed QKD protocol is 
applicable even in the classical system, where some quantum devices and detectors are 
needed. The quantum system can be restricted in a small portion of the used system, which 
the user can communicate into a classical system, but the secret key is created by the 
quantum system.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a technical mechanism to create a secret key 
based on the law of physics. In the cryptography, the law of physics explains the 
measurement modules of the photons, which are controlled naturally by only the 
environment. Usually a pair of legitimate participants will exist to establish a full 
communication. Alice and Bob are the common characters, whereby Alice is a sender as 
well as Bob is a receiver. The illegal interruptions usually are made by Eve, who is an 
eavesdropper. Sharing a secret key between Alice and Bob is designed to be a long string 
of bits. These bits are corresponding to the length of the original message (plain-text). In 
addition, the created secret key is utilized in one of the symmetric cryptography algorithms 
that is called One-Time-Pad (OTP) protocol [4]. The OTP algorithm requires a long secret 
key that basically should be as long of bits as the original message. Then both the secret 
key and original message will be XORed to produce the cipher-text [16]. Thus, the security 
of encoding a message by OTP protocol is very robust as long as the secret key length is 
unexpected.   
Although using quantum key distribution protocols to create a secret key is still not 
publicly available, the quantum key distribution has proved its stability and secrecy in 
several studies [17-19] and laboratories [20] [21] [22] [23]. One of the physics 
fundamentals that supports the QKD protocol usage is the Non-Cloning theory [8, 24, 25]. 
The Non-Cloning theory provides an alteration to the end users in case any interruption 
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occurs in the quantum system. In other words, the quantum system will be protected by 
destroying the submitted data if this data (quantum bits) was measured. Furthermore, 
assisting the natural theory (The Non-Cloning theory) with algorithmic (mathematical) 
equations will provide a robust system that has the ability to stand against the common 
security attacks [26]. Essentially, the usability of the created QKD protocol is very 
important to conclude a stable protocol, which provides a minimum rate of the Runtime-
Execution. To explain the methodology and the usability of quantum key distribution 
protocol, here are some of the well-known QKD protocols that will be exhibited as follows:  
2.1 The BB84 Protocol 
 2.1.1 The history of the BB84 Protocol 
In 1984, Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard were introduced to the BB84 protocol  
[27]. The BB84 protocol is based on the security approved by the non-cloning theorem. 
This security comes from supporting unconditional secret keys and efficiency of detecting 
the eavesdroppers over the quantum channel [28]. The BB84 protocol requires pair of 
communication channels, the first channel is a quantum channel (submitting qubits) and 
the second is a classical (submitting bits) channel. The quantum channel is applied into 
either a free space (earth atmosphere or space) or fiber optic cable while the classical 
channel should be by any communication system (e.g. internet) that unnecessarily needs 
to be secure [29]. 
The functionality of the BB84 protocol is based on the photon movement 
(polarization) into different four states in the superposition. The single photon is created 
by one of the legitimate parties into quantum devices, and then the created photons will 
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pass through one of the two bases detectors. These bases are either rectilinear basis ⊕ 
where photons are polarized at angle 0o () or 90o (), or diagonal basis ⊗ where 0 is 
represented by photons polarized at 45o () and 1 by photons polarized at 135o ()[30]. 
Bennett and Brassard in [31] mentioned that the conventional cryptography is unsecure if 
the secret key is employed more than once. As a definition, the power of QKD protocol is 
combined into three aspects: The first aspect relies on the neutrality of the physics law, 
where the photon will by destroyed in case detecting any interruption. The second aspect 
is a photon conversion that will be computed mathematically and gives a hard guess to both 
created functions and algorithms. The third aspect is the previous aspects when will be 
gathered in computer system, and then is applied in different devices and hardware.  
 
Figure 2. The process of transmitting a message through quantum key distribution protocol 
between Alice and Bob with possibility to be eavesdropped by Eve. 
2.1.2 The functionality of the BB84 protocol 
The BB84 protocol is considered the background of QKD protocols, in which most 
of the invented QKD protocols come from the general methodology of the BB84 method. 
Practically speaking, the BB84 protocol is based on the polarization of photon states that 
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are unconditionally secure [32]. The process of establishing a secret key between Alice and 
Bob is explained as follows: 
1. Alice creates a random number of bits (𝑛) that mostly corresponds to the length of the 
plaintext needed to transfer between the legitimate parties. These random bits can be 
generated in a classical mode. 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
String of Bits that Is Used to Initiate a Random Qubits 
2. Alice flips the coin into another operation in order to determine the single bit, in which 
bases will pass through. Therefore, Alice is unable to determine the bases and the bits 
in each submission as shown in Table (1). 
Table 1. The bases in the BB84 protocol 
States/ Basis ⊕ ⊗ 
|0⟩   
|1⟩   
 
3. Alice sends the initiated states to Bob through the quantum channel based on step (2), 
where the submitted photons polarization should be in one of four states. These states 
are 0o, 45o, 90o, and 135o angle, where each one angle has a certain reflection [33] as 
illustrated in Table (2).  
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Table 2. The procedure of submission for the BB84 protocol 
Alice sends n random bits in random bases 
Bit number 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Alice’s random bits 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Alice’s random bases + + × + + + 
Alice sends       
 
4. Bob measures the upcoming photons by a quantum device detector and then creates a 
random measurement on the received photons, which these photons will represent 
pairs of bases as shown in Table (3). 
Table 3. The procedure of received photons in the BB84 protocol 
Bob receives n random bits in random measurements 
Bit number 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Bob’s random bases × + × × + × 
Bob observes       
Bob’s bits 0 1 1 1 1 0 
5. Bob reads the raw secret key that is produced by the measurement in step (4), and Bob 
then announces the raw key through a classical channel to Alice.  
6. Both Alice and Bob start estimating the errors that may be caused by Eve, so that there 
are many error correction protocols that are used in the BB84. The raw key is the 
process, where Alice and Bob compare the matched bits and discard the uncorrelated 
data that is well-known as a shifting procedure. The sifting phase enhances detecting 
any attempts by Eve, where the legitimate parties can realize if an eavesdropper tried 
to gain any information or not.  
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Table 4. The reconciliation phase in the BB84 protocol 
Alice and Bob publicly compare bases used 
Bit number 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Alice’s random bases + + × + + + 
Bob’s random bases × + × × + × 
Agreement       
Shared secret key  1 1  1  
2.2 The B92 Protocol 
B92 is a QKD protocol that was presented by Charles H. Bennett in 1992. The 
protocol was designed in non-orthogonal polarization photon or in low-intensity light pulse 
[34]. The protocol is like the BB84 protocol, except the BB84 protocol uses two bases and 
four states unlike the B92 protocol that uses two states. The B92 protocol has two channels 
to communicate between two legitimate parties. The first channel is a quantum channel, 
where Alice submits photons into different states. The second channel is a classical channel 
(e.g. Internet), which is utilized to confirm the received and submitted qubits by the 
communicated participants. The classical channel is also employed to correct the errors 
that occur by the environment or an eavesdropper.  
 
Figure 3. The bases of the B92 protocol polarization  
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2.2.1 The functionality of B92 protocol 
 There are several steps to initiate a secret key in the B92 protocol. These steps 
include the procedures of quantum submissions and classical exchanging. The quantum 
submissions are based on submitting a vector of qubits through the quantum channel. On 
the other hand, the classical channel provides an ability to exchange information between 
the communicated parties for confirming and correcting the quantum communications. The 
steps are briefly explained in the follows:  
• Alice initiates a vector of random bits 𝜔 ∈ {0,1}𝑛, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛 > 𝑁 , (N is the length of 
the created secret key) and then sends to Bob in two states {|0⟩, |+⟩}. 
• Bob will create a string of random numbers and decides, in which basis will choose; 
if the random number is (0) he will use (⨂), otherwise he will use (⨁). 
• Bob measures the upcoming states {|0⟩, |+⟩} into random bases {⨂, ⨁} [10].  
• Bob is ready to create his string of qubits (Vector Test T) 𝑇 ∈ {0,1}𝑛 𝑛 > 𝑁. by 
following certain roles: if Bob’s measurement equal to |0⟩ 𝑜𝑟 |+⟩ then the value of T 
= 0, if Bob’s measurement is equal to |1⟩ 𝑜𝑟 |−⟩ then T = 1. 
The above steps explain the quantum exchanges between two legitimate parties. 
Later, more critical procedures will be applied in the final phase to provide the secret key. 
In the classical channel, Alice and Bob should confirm their submissions and ignore any 
untrusted qubits. The classical communication is established over a public channel to 
guarantee an error free of exchanged data that occurred during the quantum key distribution 
process. Furthermore, the reconciliation phase reveals some errors that may have occurred 
by eavesdropping or an environment during photon submission. The concluded error rate 
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will judge and control the amount of bits that will be distilled [35]. In other words, there is 
a limit rate that allows both parties to continue the correction phase or not. Therefore, if 
the error rate has a high number of interrupted qubits, both sides will decide to ignore the 
whole received qubits (or vice versa). 
Eve’s ability to disrupt the photons is very critical during building a secret key, but 
as mentioned in [34, 36], there are many considerations that make the B92 or non-
orthogonal submission protocol more reliable and robust against Eve’s attacks. Moreover, 
the non-orthogonal states are not necessary to be non-orthogonal pure states |𝑝0⟩ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |𝑝1⟩, 
but also it is possible to be any non-orthogonal mixed states |𝑚0⟩ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |𝑚1⟩. More 
precisely, the Man-In-the-Middle (MIM) attack is still a huge challenge for this protocol, 
because Eve is still able to impersonate one of the communicated parties. The public 
channel that both (Alice and Bob) use to confirm the received photons through quantum 
channel is still a weak point. Also, there is 50% of losing or leaking these date to an 
eavesdropper [35]. Meanwhile, the B92 protocol is considered more secure than the BB84 
protocol by many scientists and experts. 
2.3 The Coherent-One-Way Protocol 
Coherent One-Way (COW) protocol was introduced by Damien Stucki, Nicolas 
Brunner, Nicolas Gisin, Valerio Scarani, and Hugo Zbinden. The COW protocol is well-
known by using decoy states through the quantum channels. The decoy states increase the 
resistance of the control against IRA attack. Moreover, the COW protocol was designed in 
a unique scheme, where the COW scheme is divided to three sections. The first section is 
more secure, where Alice can use a mode-locked laser 𝜇 to pulse a photon. These pulses 
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emit in fixed time 𝜏 with the ability to block some pulses by Alice. Functionally, the logical 
bits are encoded by a sequential two-pulse as shown in (equation 5 and 6)[37]. The second 
section is data line, which represents transmitting the pulses into optical fibers ∝ =
 0.2 𝑑𝐵/𝑘𝑚. After that, Bob starts distinguishing the upcoming pulses by using 
interferometer DB. Bob should obtain one of the non-orthogonal states:  
 
|0𝐴⟩ = | √𝜇𝑒
𝑖(2𝑘−1)𝜑⟩ |0⟩2𝑘 
(5) 
 
 
|1𝐴⟩ = |0⟩2𝑘−1| √𝜇𝑒
𝑖(2𝑘)𝜑⟩ 
(6) 
Where, ∝= √𝜇𝑡𝑡𝐵 . 
Simply, Bob tries to discriminate between |0𝐵⟩ and |1𝐵⟩. Later, Bob communicates 
with Alice to announce the detected photons. The error rate, in this line, is impossible 
especially if the detector is perfect. There is also no need for a random number generator. 
The third section represents the monitoring line, where the quantum coherence plays a role. 
The pulses will be extracted at Bob’s beam-splitter, where 𝛼𝑗 is the amplitude of pulse 𝑗. 
There are two values of 0 or 𝜇𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝐵) when the pulse enters the interferometer. If the 
both 𝛼𝑗+1 and 𝛼𝑗 are non-zero, then  𝛼𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗+1. Otherwise, if 𝛼𝑗+1 and 𝛼𝑗 are zero, then 
|DM1|
2 = |DM2|
2 = 
1
2
𝜇𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝐵) where, 
 
|𝐷𝑀1⟩ = |𝑖
𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑗+1
2
⟩ 
 
(7) 
   
 
|𝐷𝑀2⟩ = |
− 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑗+1
2
⟩ 
 
(8) 
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So, the probability of detecting both photons is  
1
2
.  
2.3.1 The COW Protocol Scheme 
1. Alice initiates a string of binary, which the bits (0) and (1) are assigned with 
probability  
𝟏−𝒇
𝟐
 , and the decoy bits will be with probability f. 
2. Bob receives the string of binary and extracts each single bit by time detection. DM 
detector is used for generating the raw key, and DM2 detector monitors the security. 
3. Alice reveals all the decoy states, and Bob then avoids all Alice’s raw key that were 
detected by sifting phase. 
4. Bob measures the detections of compound submitted photons at D2M, and Alice 
computes the coherence of photons into V1-0 and (𝑉𝑑 ) as follows: 
 
𝑉 =
𝑝(𝑀𝐷1) − 𝑝(𝑀𝐷2)
𝑝(𝑀𝐷1) + 𝑝(𝑀𝐷2)
 
(9) 
5. Lastly, Alice and Bob apply an error correction phase as well as a privacy 
amplification to conclude a secret key [38]. 
The Coherent-One-Way protocol is specialized by using a decoy state during 
photon submissions, which is well-known for preventing the Photon-Number-Splitting 
attack. 
2.4 The S09 Protocol 
S09 protocol was introduced by Eduin Esteban Hernandez Serna in 2009 [39]. The 
S09 protocol is based on public and private key cryptography, which utilizes two quantum 
channels of communication. The S09 protocol may not need a reconciliation phase into the 
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process of verifying the participants at each side of communications. The whole phases in 
this protocol are divided to three phases, which are included preparation, measurement, 
and verification and key derive. The S09 is a secure protocol because the multiple of 
exchanges that are created by Alice and Bob during creating the secret keys. 
The variation between the S09 and the BB84 protocol is shown into a qubit 
transmission between Alice and Bob in the quantum channel, where the BB84 protocol 
uses four different states, unlike S09 protocol that can use any arbitrary states. The S09 
protocol is explained in several steps as follows: 
2.4.1 Phase one 
- Alice initiates a random string of bits a, and she then picks up random bases to 
generate a string of qubits s. 
- Alice sends the s of qubits to Bob into a quantum channel. 
- Bob builds a string of binary g with the same length of s. 
- Each binary of 𝑔𝑛 will be tested as follows: 
• 𝐼𝑓 (𝑔𝑛  ==  1) → Bob applies the XZ or ZX gate to get Gn. 
• Bob then sends the 𝐺𝑛 binary to Alice. 
- Alice receives the binary string 𝐺𝑛 and measures each qubit by her first initiated 
bases for generating a string c. 
- Alice sums the string c ⊗ with the random bits in the previous step to obtain Bob’s 
random binary g. 
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2.4.2 Phase two 
- Bob creates a binary string 𝑔2 with N bits long. 
- Each bit of 𝑔2 will be under a condition: 
• 𝐼𝑓 (𝑔𝑛  ==  1) → Bob uses one of XZ or ZX gates to build k2. 
- Bob sends k2 qubits to Alice. 
- Alice measures k2 in t bases and generates a string c2. 
- Alice sums a string c2 ⊗ with the random bits and obtains the string M2. 
2.4.3 Phase three 
- Bob creates a string of binary M3 in N bits long. 
- Each bit of M3 in N will pass through: 
• If (𝑀3  ==  1) → Bob applies one of XZ or ZX gates to generate k3. 
- Bob sends k3 qubits to Alice. 
- Alice measures the k3 by 𝑡 bases to provide a string c3. 
- Alice sums a string c3 ⊗  with random bits to build M3. 
- Alice compares all the binary strings c and M. 
The S09 protocol was created to be robust against some common quantum attacks. 
The Man-In-The-Middle (MIM) attack is one of these attacks, where the S09 protocol have 
proved to stand against. On the other hand, the S09 protocol is one of the complicated 
protocols because the qubits are exchanged multiple times during the communication 
channels between the parties. 
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2.5 The S13 Protocol 
The S13 protocol was introduced by Eduin H. Serna in 2013 [40]. This protocol 
was designed to share a secret key with the same length of the transmitted qubits. There is 
a variation between the BB84 and S13, which is included in the classical communication 
by using a random seed and asymmetric cryptography. The S13 protocol contains two 
communication channels, and these channels are the quantum and classical channels.  
2.5.1 The quantum channel 
- The quantum channel reflects exchanges of the encoded photons into four states 
|0⟩, |1⟩, |+⟩, and |−⟩, of which these states are formatted into two bases B1 
={|+⟩, |−⟩}, and B2 ={|0⟩, |1⟩}. 
- Alice initiates two random strings 𝑆𝑁 and 𝑖𝑁 that will be identical to the length of 
the secret key, and the key should be shared between Alice and Bob. 
- Alice starts building the qubits from gathering the two random strings |𝜑𝑆𝑁𝑖𝑁⟩ and 
then sends the built qubits to Bob through the quantum channel. 
- Bob creates a random string of binary 𝑚𝑁 and measures the upcoming qubits by 
corresponding bases 𝐵𝑚𝑁 to obtain the binary string 𝑎𝑁. 
- Bob sends a sequence of basis 𝑚𝑁 into classical channel. 
- Alice matches the received basis 𝑚𝑁 and 𝑆𝑁 and sends 𝐿𝑁  =  𝑆𝑁  ⊗  𝑚𝑁 to Bob. 
- Alice and Bob share a random binary string 𝑥𝑁 (considered as a seed). 
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2.5.2 The classical channel 
- Alice and Bob will exchange many binary strings with applying to a different function 
of 𝑓 as follows: 
 
𝑓(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑦) ≔ 𝑓(𝑥) = {
𝑥, 𝑧 = 0
𝑦, 𝑧 = 1
 
 
(10) 
- Alice sums 𝑖𝑁 ⨁ 𝑗𝑁 to obtain 𝑦𝑁 and then is submitted to Bob. 
- Bob encodes 𝑚𝑁 into 𝑢𝑁 and 𝑣𝑁 as: 
 𝑢𝑁 = 𝑛𝑁 ⊕ 𝑓(𝑚𝑁 , 𝑎𝑁 , 𝑏𝑁 ⊕ 𝑦𝑁), 
 
(11) 
        𝑣𝑁 = 𝑛𝑁 ⊕ 𝑓(𝑚𝑁, 𝑏𝑁 , 𝑎𝑁 ⊕ 𝑦𝑁). 
 
(12) 
So, Bob Obtains strings of 𝑢𝑁 and 𝑣𝑁 that will be sent to Alice. 
- Alice sums 𝑡𝑁⨁𝑓(𝑠𝑁 , (1 ⊕ 𝑖𝑁)⨁𝑢𝑁, 𝑗𝑁⨁𝑣𝑁) and decodes 𝑚𝑁 to obtain a private 
string 𝑚𝑁. 
- To process the private reconciliation, Alice compares 𝑠𝑁 and 𝑚𝑁 to obtain 𝑙𝑁  =
 𝑠𝑁  ⊕  𝑚𝑁. 
- Bob obtains 𝑠𝑁 by summing 𝑚𝑁 ⊕ 𝑙𝑁, and applies: 
 𝑓(𝑙𝑁, 𝑎𝑁 , 𝑏𝑁 ⊕ 𝑦𝑁) ≡ 𝑖𝑁, 
 
(13) 
 𝑓(𝑙𝑁 , 𝑎𝑁 ⊕ 𝑦𝑁 , 𝑏𝑁) ≡ 𝑗𝑁 . (14) 
In perfect condition of the communication between Alice and Bob, both will share 
four secure keys  𝑠𝑁 , 𝑚𝑁 , 𝑖𝑁 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗𝑁. This secure key represents the final secret key. 
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2.6 The SARG04 Protocol 
This protocol reflects the originality of the protocol BB84. SARG04 was introduced 
[41] by Scarain, Acin, Ribordy, and Gisin in 2004. Inventing the SARG04 protocol came 
after using four states in the BB84, and the authors thought that utilizing the four states 
could build a new protocol.  This protocol would be more robust than BB84; especially 
when weaken laser pulses are used instead of a single photon source. The authors worked 
on the SARG04 to be more efficient against the PNS attacks. Furthermore, SARG04 and 
BB84 are essentially equivalent to each other in the quantum communication phase, but 
the difference is shown in the encoding and decoding phase of classical information.  
The SARG04 protocol is an experiment to solve some situations found in the BB84 
protocol such as information that is produced by weak pulses and received by an 
incomplete detector [42]. Even though the SARG04 came with a new vision, it respects the 
BB84 in its instructions. For instance, when Alice starts to match the key with equivalent 
qubits from Bob, the bit error rate could reach to 𝑣𝑠/2 or more (precisely, it is a probability 
until ½). The difference can be seen occurring when the detection rate is measured in the 
SARG04. The detection rate will increase in the presence of error, unlike with BB84 [43].  
To show the sequential steps between two legitimate parties (Alice and Bob), the 
SARG04 protocol can be summarized in a one-way communication, where a V-Photon 
source (V = 1, 2) as follows: 
Step 1: Alice creates an 𝑛 of signals that starts randomly with each one of the four sets 
(states), and Bob should receive one of the two states. 
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Step 2: When the signal reaches to Bob, it should be measured randomly in two bases 
by a quantum detector. If the signal measurement does not match or could not be 
measured, Bob informs Alice about ignoring this signal. 
Step 3: Alice reports each created signal of photon and the state of the photon in the 
superposition set. Bob then matches the result by two states. If the result was proven 
as an orthogonal for one of the states in the set, the other state has already been sent. 
On the other hand, the match will not be an orthogonal to each state in the set. In this 
case, Bob knows that the result is not incisive, so that he will tell Alice about the result 
either matched or not. 
Step 4: Some bits are chosen randomly to be tested and informed of their positions by 
Alice, after which Bob will figure out the bit error rate 𝑒𝑦, so if the measurement was 
very high that leads to the cancelling of the protocol. 
Step 5: According to the previous step, Alice and Bob keep the only conclusive 
untested bits that will be utilized specifically during bit error correction and privacy 
amplification [44]. 
2.7 The EPR Protocol 
The EPR Pair Paradox protocol was invented by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 
who presented the thought experiment in 1935 [45-47]. The main thought utilizes three 
states of polarization with considering |𝜃⟩, where the polarization state of photon linearly 
polarized at angle 𝜃 . More precisely, the EPR deeply is pair of particles that can be 
separated even at great distance, so that both show a paradoxical (action at a distance).  
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To explain the nation of EPR clearly, when one photon is measured in the right 
side, the outcome can be a vertical linear polarization state |0⟩. On the other hand, the 
measurement will be a horizontal linear polarization state |
𝜋
2
⟩ at the left side and vice versa. 
The EPR is one of the four Bell states as follows [48, 49]: 
 
|𝜓1⟩ =
1
√2
(|00⟩ + |11⟩) 
 
(15) 
 
|𝜓2⟩ =
1
√2
(|00⟩ − |11⟩) 
 
(16) 
 
|𝜓3⟩ =
1
√2
(|10⟩ + |10⟩) 
 
(17) 
 
|𝜓4⟩ =
1
√2
(|10⟩ − |10⟩). 
(18) 
In 1991, Artur K. Ekert proposed the EPR protocol that is completely based on 
using an entanglement between two remote parties. There also are few modifications that 
have been occurred since the first publication of EPR became famous. Hwang et al. in [50] 
explained some of these modifications of EPR protocol. The process of EPR protocol is 
shown in sequential steps that demonstrate the original protocol as follows [51]: 
1. Alice creates a sequence of EPR photons (Entangled qubits) n, where she keeps 
one photon in the memory and sends the other photon to Bob. 
2. Both communicators choose a random sequence of bases, where these bases are 
utilized for measuring particles at each side of communication. 
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Table 5. The measurements in the EPR protocol during an exchanging phase 
Alice and Bob measure in each of their random bases 
Bit number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Alice’s random bases × × + + × + 
Alice’s observations       
Bob’s random bases × + + × × + 
Bob’s observations       
3. Alice and Bob match the outcomes of the photon measurement in public and 
keep just the qubits that were measured in the same basis. 
Table 6. The measurements in the EPR protocol during the reconciliation phase 
Alice and Bob PUBLICLY compare their bases 
Bit number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Alice’s random bases × × + + × + 
Public channel       
Bob’s random bases × + + × × + 
Agree       
The remaining steps of the EPR protocol includes the decision that will be made 
by the communicating parties. The public channel will be the next choice to ignore errors 
that may have occurred during exchanging the qubits into the quantum channel. 
2.8 The Differential Phase Shift Protocol 
Differential Phase Shift (DPS) Protocol [52] was introduced by Kyo Inoue, Edo 
Waks, and Yoshihisa Yamamoto in 2002. The DPS is based on non-orthogonal four states, 
which Alice’s photon splits into three pulses and randomly modulated. Furthermore, Bob 
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measures the upcoming photons in a differential phase. As mentioned in [53] the DPS 
protocol is more convenient for a Fiber-Optics transmission and offering a key creation 
efficiency higher than the BB84 protocol. 
The DPS protocol is technically utilized to create a secret key between two parties. 
The protocol starts at the sender side when the single photon will be divided to three paths 
(a, b and c).  The divided photon then will be recombined by a beam splitter (BS) or an 
optical switcher (SW) as illustrated in Figure (4). Moreover, the time delay between a, b 
and b, c is equal, so that the recombined photon should be converted to (0 || 𝜋). In addition, 
the incoming photons from Alice to Bob are divided into two paths and recombined by a 
(50:50) beam splitter. The DPS protocol procedure is briefly explained in the following 
steps: 
• Alice sends a single photon from (a) to the short path in Bob’s side. 
• A photon pushes through (a) to the long path in Bob, and through (b) to the short 
path in Bob. 
• A photon pushes through (b) to the long path in Bob, and through (c) to the short 
path in Bob. 
• A photon pushes through (c) to the long path in Bob. 
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Figure 4. The DPS protocol scheme between two legitimate parties (Alice and Bob). 
In the first part of processing, two probabilities are interfered in step (2) and (3), 
where the phase difference (0 or ±𝜋) depends on Alice’s modulation. Furthermore, each 
of the detectors clicks on (0) and the other on (±𝜋) are a phase difference. Lastly, when 
Bob’s detectors click, Bob just records the time and the clicked detector. In the classical 
communication, Alice also knows the clicked detector at Bob. 
2.9 The KMB09 Protocol 
In 2009, KMB09 protocol was presented in [54] by Khan, Murphy, and Beige, 
which was designed to be robust against photon number splitting attacks. Khan et. Al, 
described the protocol as being between two parties (Alice and Bob) and an eavesdropper 
(Eve). Alice and Bob then must use two states of bases (𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓), where the applied 
condition should be in different indices 𝑖 when both use the same basis. Moreover, 𝑖 index 
is publicly announced between two legitimate parties, which can be pointed to Alice’s 
prepared indices as 𝑖, and Bob’s measured indices as 𝑗. 
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In the KMB09 protocol, the authors have tried to create a QKD protocol that is 
capable to stand against the Intercept-Resend (IRA) attacks. Moreover, the KMB09 was 
created when the other QKD protocols were employed to a few kilometers, but after that, 
the system error rate exceeded the eavesdropper’s presence [55]. Also, the KMB09 was 
optimized by testing Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) and Index Transmission Error Rate 
(ITER). Next steps will briefly explain the KMB09 design as follows: 
1. Alice generates a random sequence of classical bits and then randomly specifies 
each bit a certain index (𝑖 =  1, 2 …  𝑁). 
2. Alice then sends the prepared bits in single photons into |𝑒𝑖⟩  or |𝑓𝑖⟩ to Bob. 
3. Each incoming state measured by Bob should be randomly switched between the 
basis 𝑒 and 𝑓. 
 
Figure 5. The polarized states that are used by Alice, Bob, and Eve. 
4. Alice in public communication announces Bob about the random sequential 
indices 𝑖 to create the secret key. 
5. Bob translates the measurement outcomes. 
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6. Bob then communicates with Alice in public for the photon measurements, which 
were successfully received and have obtained the secret key. 
7. Alice and Bob can determine whether Eve was eavesdropping to their 
communication or not by calculating the equations of the ITER and QBER as 
follows [56]. 
 𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑅 = 1 −
1
2𝑁
∑ ∑[|⟨𝑔𝑘|𝑒𝑖⟩
4 + ⟨𝑔𝑘|𝑓𝑖⟩
4|],
𝑁
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
  (19) 
 
 𝑃𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅 =
2𝑁 − ∑ ∑ [|⟨𝑒𝑖|𝑔𝑘⟩
4| + |⟨𝑓𝑖|𝑔𝑘⟩
4|]𝑁𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
4𝑁 − ∑ ∑ [|⟨𝑒𝑖|𝑔𝑘⟩2| + |⟨𝑓𝑖|𝑔𝑘⟩2|]
𝑁
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
2 . (20) 
 
Furthermore, the polarization of one photon is initiated into multi-dimensional 
states, which is based on orthogonal and non-orthogonal bases.  
The KMB09 protocol was designed to be under ideal conditions, where it is 
impossible for Alice and Bob to have different indices while they use the same basis. This 
protocol is more robust against any eavesdropper who tries to hide his/her presence. Also, 
the strong correlation between the QBER and ITER makes the eavesdropper produce a 
distinct signature that is easy to be detected. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PLAN 
According to the previous QKD protocols, there are many weaknesses that give the 
eavesdroppers a chance to attack any transmitted data (plain-text). The tremendous weak 
point lies on an authentication property that must be approved between the communicating 
entities before exchanging any information. Moreover, many QKD protocols utilize a 
public (classical) channel to correct errors that might happen during the quantum 
communications. This public channel is mostly used without any special security protocol, 
which could be a huge gap to processing a secret key.  
3.1 The Designed QKD Protocol 
Based on the studied QKD protocols, a new quantum key distribution scheme was 
developed to stand against the common quantum attacks as well as providing an 
authentication link before starting any exchanges. Moreover, the protocol is named AK15 
protocol and presented at the IEEE LISAT conference in 2015. The proposed protocol was 
designed to include two quantum channels. One of these channels is an EPR channel that 
is based on initiating an entangled state [57]. The other channel is a quantum channel, 
where the sender and the receiver can submit the data to create a secret key. 
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Figure 6. The proposed QKD protocol (AK15) scheme between two legitimate parties. 
Essentially, the proposed protocol avoids using any public channels except into the 
EPR channel, which is a small submission of two binaries. These two binary bits are 
considered as a slight transmission between the sender and the receiver to confirm and 
release the type of used quantum gates. The protocol begins with preparations by Alice (the 
sender), which sorts the converted plain text into a matrix. This matrix should be filled by 
data into a lower-triangle matrix, the decoy states into an upper-triangle matrix, and the 
diagonal line. The diagonal line should be filled after summation to result even rows in the 
whole matrix. 
(
𝜔11 ⋯ 𝛽𝑖𝑗
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜑𝑖𝑗 ⋯ 𝜔𝑖𝑖
) 
Where the matrix may have a 2𝑛 of qubits, 𝜔 is the parity states that convert the 
rows of the matric to even rows, 𝜑 the original data that will be initiated as secret key, 𝛽 is 
decoy states that will be created randomly by Alice, and {𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 = 1,2,3, … … . . 𝑛}.  
Based on the previous preparation, Alice can initiate an EPR pair string that 
contains the following: initiating time 𝑡1, number of used matrices (𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖 =  1, 2 …  𝑁) 
  
35 
𝑛, size of matrix (rows (a) = columns (b)) m, string of diagonal parity p, number of used 
states (dimension of particle) 𝑠, row indices 𝑅, and time termination t2. Moreover, the EPR 
string will collapse when one of the communicating parties starts measuring upcoming 
photons. 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑘𝑒𝑦 = {𝑡1 𝑛 𝑚 𝑝 𝑠 𝑅 𝑡2} 
 During the EPR submission, Alice should communicate with Bob by a public 
channel. This public channel will be only utilized to send one string of two bits. Each two 
bits reflects a quantum gate that should be used by Bob. The two bits will be configured as 
follows: 
|Φ +⟩ 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 
|Φ −⟩ 𝑍 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛) 
|Ψ +⟩ 𝑋 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑠𝑤𝑎𝑝 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟) 
|Ψ −⟩ 𝑍 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒. 
Therefore, Bob should have the right outcomes after the whole teleportation 
process. If there are any errors detected by both parties, starting over is the only way to 
avoid any eavesdroppers.   
3.2 The proposed Protocol Scheme 
The proposed QKD protocol employs two quantum observables. The polarization 
is one of these observables that can be used in the quantum channel. The second observable 
is an entanglement state of particles in the EPR channel, where each particle should be one 
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of the Bell states. The proposed protocol includes several sequential steps to create a secret 
key. These steps are processed in two levels of communications as follows: 
3.2.1 Authentication Phase 
1. Alice creates a sequence of EPR pair n (Non-Random) that is based on data filled 
in the prepared matrix (or matrices) in quantum phase and then submits to Bob. 
This submission will be as a string of qubits, where Alice keeps one photon in the 
quantum memory and sends the other to Bob. 
 |𝜑⟩ = 𝛼|0⟩ + |1⟩,                𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
(21) 
 
|Ψ⟩ =
1
√2
(|01⟩ ± |10⟩), 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
(22) 
 
|Φ⟩ =
1
√2
(|00⟩ ± |11⟩).  𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
(23) 
2. Bob receives the EPR string in a certain time, and no matter who measures first, 
because the particle will collapse on the same state whether Alice or Bob started 
measuring.  These measurements will be in the Bell states as follows: 
 𝜎𝑥 = (
0 1
1 0
), 
 
(24) 
 𝜎𝑧 = (
1 0
0 −1
), 
 
(25) 
 𝜎𝑦 = (
0 −𝑖
𝑖 0
). 
 
(26) 
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3.  After measuring the whole EPR string, Bob will decide if the qubits are still secure 
or the qubits were compromised by either eavesdropper or the environment. If the 
outcomes are separated (Alice’s photon with the unknown-photon), the conclusion 
will be in entangled states between Alice’s states and the unknown states. In this 
case, the original entanglement will be broken as well as be one of the 
superposition states. 
 |𝜑⟩ ⊗ |Ψ +⟩ ≅  
1
√2
(|Φ⟩ + |Ψ⟩ + |Ψ⟩ + |Φ⟩). (27) 
This occurred after dropping the photons by Bob. 
4. The measurements in the Bell states will physically effect Bob’s particles and will 
separate the photons. 
3.2.2 Quantum Phase 
1. Alice submits the EPR and data qubits simultaneously to Bob for reducing the 
Runtime-Execution. The date qubits should be submitted in a two-dimensional 
photon (or more), and this photon will be polarized in two bases (|Ψ ±⟩, |Φ ±⟩) 
and four states (|0⟩, |−⟩, |1⟩, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |+⟩). 
{|↑⟩ … |→⟩ … |↓⟩} 
2. Bob will receive a sequence of qubits and will use well-known measurement 
based on the EPR communication outcomes in the Bell state. 
3.  The secret key should be extracted and fully secure, and both parties will know 
the secret key without need to any public (classical) communications. 
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Figure 7. The mechanism of the multi communications in the proposed protocol. 
The previous proposed QKD protocol phases are done simultaneously and both 
communicating parties can decide either to continue or to start over [58]. Usually, any 
interruption happened during the quantum channel will not affect the submitted data 
because the receiver will realize the presence of eavesdropper as well as the position of 
interrupted photons. 
Furthermore, the whole strategy of the proposed protocol is illustrated in Figure 
(7), where the EPR communication is highlighted on the right side and the qubit 
communication is highlighted on the left side. In essence, the authentication approval 
should be confirmed during the EPR communications. Subsequently, transferring the 
qubits IQUBIT through the quantum channel will be the last step in the exchange of data 
in order to create a shared secret key (SSK). 
As shown in Algorithm (1) [59], the proposed QKD algorithm contains three 
important loops. These loops represent the main operating functions that are based on EPR 
preparations, EPR communications IEPR, and qubits submissions IQUBIT. A and B 
represent the sender and receiver sequentially. 
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 ALGORITHM.1    The Proposed QKD Protocol 
1.  A prepares Xn qubits into DM //Preparing DM 
2.  
While (𝑋𝑛 {
|∅⟩  → {0,1}𝑛
|𝜑⟩  → {0,1}𝑛
|𝜔⟩  → {0,1}1
 
//Plaintext 
//Decoy states 
//Parity states 
3.  𝑋𝑛  →  𝐷𝑀𝐴 //Converting X to DM 
4.          𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏, 𝐷𝑀𝐵 ∈  𝐷𝑀𝐴 //Preparing IEPR 
5.  𝐴 → {00,01,10,11}𝑛 //Quantum gates in classic 
6.  𝒊𝒇 𝐼𝐸𝑃𝑅(𝐴 == |0⟩): //Initiating EPR connection 
7.            𝐵 = |1⟩; //Entangled state 
8.  𝒆𝒔𝒍𝒆:  
9.           𝐵 = |0⟩; //Entangled state 
10.  𝒆𝒏𝒅;  
11.  𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 (𝐼𝐸𝑃𝑅 ∈ 𝐷𝑀𝐵) //Setup IEPR into DMB 
12.             𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏: 𝐷𝑀𝐵 ∈ 𝐷𝑀𝐴 //Adjusting DMB to be DMA 
13.  𝒊𝒇 (𝐴 == 𝐵):  
14.             𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑇 = 1; //IQUBIT requested 
15.            𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑇 → 𝑆𝑆𝐾  
16.  𝒆𝒍𝒔𝒆:  
17.           𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟; //IQUBIT denied 
18.  𝒆𝒏𝒅;  
19.  𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 ≈ 𝑆𝑆𝐾 //Obtaining SSK. 
 
The EPR preparation time also will not be included during the whole Runtime-
Execution, where the plaintext X should be prepared by A to extract the needed information 
for the EPR submission. The prepared information will be sent into entangled states (EPR 
channel). If the EPR communication was applied successfully, A and B will start to 
exchange qubits through the quantum channel. 
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CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATIONS 
The proposed QKD protocol was implemented by a classical system in MATLAB 
codes, which are compared with the most common quantum key distribution protocols 
(Literature review). Special quantum libraries (LDPC, QCF, QLib, and QETLAB)[60-62] 
were used to convert the classical system of particles measurement to the quantum system. 
For instance, the classical system (bits) can read the input and output into just a binary (0 
or 1), so that the quantum measurements will not give the right result on the classical 
system. The exception of having an accurate result depends on customized libraries that 
will assist the system to read inputs and outputs in the superposition (qubit).  
 
Figure 8. The cycle of creating a secret key into EPR and Quantum channels with approving 
authentication as well as using minimum rate of classical communication. 
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The used technique in the proposed protocol is based on two scenarios. First 
scenario, initiating an entangled state into a communication channel is for transferring only 
the Bell’s states into so called an EPR channel. The EPR channel provides a shared data to 
the legitimate communicators, who will be authenticated to exchange a secret key. Based 
on the rate of success during the EPR connection, both party members will be able to finish 
creating a secret key without any difficulty.  
Additionally, many experiments were established to make sure the proposed QKD 
protocol is efficient. Applying the security equation J(k) and the entropy security S(k) [63] 
based on Shannon Entropy as shown in Figure (9) are procedures to test the capability of 
standing the proposed protocol against the quantum attacks.  Moreover, initiating different 
types of errors is very important to get a high level of result quality.  
 
Figure 9. The measurement of the proposed QKD protocol security and the entropy of security. 
The result shown above for the proposed QKD protocol provides more secure 
information than the well-known QKD protocols. The secrecy is approved by many 
powerful features such as inserting cells of matrix, parity of decoy states, and flipping the 
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submitted rows. Therefore, the security of the proposed protocol has a capability to stand 
against any attacks either active or passive attacks.     
 
Figure 10. The Single-Sided Amplitude Spectrum and corrupted signal with Zero-Mean Random 
Noise. 
The proposed protocol is considered as a logical scenario to create a secret key, so 
that some noise resources should be applied to experiment the protocol ability during 
presenting these noises. As shown in Figures (10) and (11), the White Gaussian Noise was 
applied with random noise resources.   
 
Figure 11. The qubits error probability’s curve for BPSK modulation with White Noise. 
  
43 
As mentioned above, a different type of noise may harm the system and could cause 
an infinite looping. More precisely, an extra time into the reconciliation phase does mean 
two vary scenarios. One of these scenarios is the ability to fix gaps that occurred by the 
corrupted qubits. The second scenario is a chance for listening to the submitted data with 
an increase of the attacks life. 
Although different quantum attacks decrease the efficiency of each QKD protocol, 
the QKD protocols are protected by the physics theory that is called the non-cloning theory. 
This theory will guarantee exchanging information by destroying particles. In other words, 
the non-cloning theory will not guarantee any successes of running the system. Therefore, 
the physics theory can be a value factor to initiate a secret key, but it should be included 
with other classical security mechanisms.  
 
Figure 12. The correlation between the submitted and received qubits. 
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As illustrated above in Figure (12), the proposed QKD protocol shows no-
correlation between the submitted and received qubits. The non-correlation has occurred 
by using the matrix to sort the submitted qubits. The received qubits also will be inserted 
into a matrix, and the receiver then will organize the rows depending on the EPR 
communication. The non-correlation in these measurements prove the difficulty to find out 
the relation between the submitted and the received qubits. Therefore, an eavesdropper 
cannot gain any information by attacking this protocol because the submitted data will not 
match with the original plain text.   
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1 The Runtime-Execution  
The Runtime-Execution is one of the measurements that is primary considered in 
this case-study. All the studied QKD protocols and the proposed protocol were converted 
to programing codes on MATLAB with supporting by quantum libraries [64-66]. The 
studied protocols were tested during the Runtime-Execution time into many sequential 
sizes of qubits. The results show variations based on each protocol algorithm. For instance, 
the B92 protocol is one of the few QKD protocols that runs in short time. Moreover, the 
B92 protocol uses a simple qubits initiation in two non-orthogonal states. The following 
figures will show the Runtime-Executions for all the QKD protocols with 500 qubits.   
Furthermore, the differentiations of the Runtime-Executions are based on the 
mechanism of each QKD protocol algorithm. Executing multi-steps of the QKD protocol 
during exchanging data between the communicated parties might be either an advantage or 
disadvantage. If the designed complicity in the algorithm of the QKD protocol provides an 
impossibility to reach the exchanged data or to interrupt any submitted information, so that 
the complicity will be an advantage. On the other hand, measuring and computing data 
during the communication will be a disadvantage, if the difficulty causes long procedures 
with a breakable system. 
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Figure 13. The Runtime-Execution during exchanging data between two legitimate parties in the 
B92 protocol, which reflects a 500 photons (Qubits) string with applying a noise. 
 
Figure 14. The Runtime-Execution during exchanging data between two legitimate parties in the 
BB84 protocol, which reflects a 500 photons (Qubits) string with applying a noise. 
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Figure 15. The Runtime-Execution during exchanging data between two parties in the Coherent-
One-Way protocol, which reflects a 500 photons (Qubits) string as well as applying decoy states 
with a noise. 
 
Figure 16. The Runtime-Execution during exchanging data between two legitimate parties in the 
Deferential-Phase-Shifting (DPS) protocol, which reflects measuring a qubits string in slot time. 
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Figure 17. The Runtime-Execution during exchanging data between two legitimate parties in the 
EPR protocol, which reflects a 500 photons (Qubits) string with applying a noise. 
 
Figure 18. The Runtime-Execution during exchanging data between two legitimate parties in the 
S09 protocol, which reflects a 500 photons (qubits) string with applying a white noise. 
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Figure 19. The Runtime-Execution during exchanging data between two legitimate parties in the 
S13 protocol, which reflects a 500 photons (Qubits) string with a white noise. 
 
Figure 20. The Runtime-Execution during exchanging data between two legitimate parties in the 
SARG04 protocol, which has similarity to the BB84 protocol except in the classical connection. 
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Table 7. The Runtime-Execution for the QKD protocols (ms). 
QKD 
Protocols 
32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 Average 
BB84 0.000440 0.000670 0.000794 0.000857 0.000674 0.000756 0.001200 0.0007701 
B92 0.000165 0.000177 0.000204 0.000263 0.000271 0.000286 0.000288 0.0002361 
SARG04 0.000600 0.000850 0.000908 0.000990 0.001000 0.001220 0.001300 0.0009811 
EPR 0.000100 0.000164 0.000165 0.000172 0.000178 0.000180 0.000183 0.0001631 
KMB09 0.002500 0.005100 0.005800 0.009100 0.010600 0.013200 0.018100 0.0092000 
DPS 0.030900 0.039400 0.039500 0.039800 0.058400 0.078300 0.092430 0.0541043 
COW 0.000450 0.000620 0.000983 0.001100 0.001240 0.001900 0.001954 0.0011782 
S09 0.020700 0.024200 0.024400 0.025000 0.025700 0.026000 0.035600 0.0259429 
S13 0.000217 0.000297 0.000305 0.000558 0.000558 0.000612 0.000672 0.0004599 
AK15 0.004000 0.004300 0.005400 0.006200 0.007100 0.007600 0.008100 0.0061000 
 
The previous Table (7) shows the Runtime-Execution measurement in different 
qubits lengths. The DPS protocol shows the highest running time because the DPS protocol 
depends on the solt time during the measurement. On the other hand, the DPS is not 
considered as the worse Runtime-Execution, if the protocol runs low number of qubits (256 
and below). Next, the S09 protocol takes a long time of processing, because the S09 was 
designed to be a complicated exchanging protocol. The S09 does not have a classical 
channel to reconcilate errors during the quantum communication, which is based on 
communications through only quantum channels. The multiple exchanges during the 
quantum channels consume a long time of processing from initaition steps to creation of 
the secret key. Otherwise, the S09 protocol is stable as long as the length of qubit string is 
below 1024 qubits.  
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Figure 21. The Runtime-Execution for QKD Protocols (ms). 
The Runtime-Execution provides a wide evaluation about the mechanism of 
running each protocol. As above-mentioned results in Table (7), the proposed QKD 
protocol could not fulfill the best result of running time, but it is not the worst. The delay 
of the proposed protocol and the DPS protocol depend on the design of each protocol. 
Moreover, the proposed protocol includes a preparation phase, where this preparation 
should deal with inserting qubits in each cell of well-known size matrix. This operation 
takes an extra time more than the regular encryption operations. On the other hand, the 
DPS protocol is based on submitting a sequence of photons into different beam-splitters, 
and these photons will be measured by passing through detectors. As a result of these 
experiments, the Runtime-Execution is very critical measurement, especially, when any 
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delay could cause a loss for data. Therefore, the quantum cryptography has tried to solve 
this issue physically by carrying a lot of data in one photon [67]. 
5.2 The efficiency 
The efficiency measurements in the quantum cryptography are determined by the 
Qubit Error Rate (QBER), so that any QKD protocol can be diagnosed to be secure or 
insecure against the quantum attacks. The proposed QKD protocol fulfilled a low QBER 
that makes the protocol more efficient than the most common QKD protocols. This 
measurement shows a few qubits that are advanced as correct qubits as well as error qubits. 
To calculate the QBER, the whole submitted and received qubits will be calculated and 
then applied as follows: 
 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅 =  ∑
𝑠𝑖
𝑛
×100 (28) 
 
where, S is the number of qubits after sifting phase, and n is the total qubits that are 
initiated by the sender.  
According to the previous collected results, the QBER recorded a different level of 
security. The highest percentage of the measured qubits in each protocol denotes more 
efficient procedure. Although the listed QKD protocols are the most common and well-
known protocols, the proposed protocol records the highest reading of efficiency 
measurement. The measurement of each protocol started at a string of 32 qubits (2𝑛) and 
then added to 64 qubits (until 2048 qubits). The capacity of each string should be duly 
noted and considered very important. A single qubit in the quantum system will take more 
space than the regular bit in the classical system. More precisely, measuring one qubit will 
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take a huge space of the regular classical memory. Therefore, the ability of measuring an 
enormous number of qubit requires a quantum memory. 
To explain the outcomes of the QBER for each protocol, some fundamentals should 
be defined. when the string of qubits contains a huge number of data, the complicity will 
be a linear. Hence, the ability of each QKD protocol to include a huge number of data is 
approved, unlike the classical system. For instance, the QKD protocol is sharply affected 
when the data increases or decreases, so that the protocol has a limited capacity. Therefore, 
the QKD protocol will not be an efficient protocol in all needed scenarios, if the protocol 
is unable to progress a big number of data. Here, this research determined the main 
differentiations between each QKD protocol based on analyzing algorithms. 
Table 8. The QBER measurements for the QKD protocol (the rate of QBER %). 
QKD 
Protocols 
32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 Average 
BB84 0.5394 0.5404 0.5547 0.5032 0.5002 0.4992 0.4943 0.5188 
B92 0.5938 0.6875 0.6969 0.7232 0.7237 0.7325 0.7411 0.6998 
SARG04 0.5291 0.5304 0.5547 0.5819 0.5904 0.6083 0.5992 0.5706 
EPR 0.4983 0.4991 0.5022 0.5192 0.5093 0.5095 0.4985 0.5052 
KMB09 0.6792 0.6804 0.6852 0.6876 0.6906 0.7095 0.7134 0.6923 
DPS 0.5933 0.6032 0.6542 0.6602 0.6538 0.6522 0.6519 0.6384 
COW 0.6402 0.6375 0.6349 0.6306 0.629 0.6286 0.6284 0.6327 
S09 0.6108 0.6149 0.6192 0.6248 0.629 0.6202 0.6187 0.6197 
S13 0.6904 0.6915 0.7019 0.7036 0.7103 0.7084 0.7093 0.7022 
AK15 0.7813 0.7825 0.7928 0.7937 0.7981 0.7985 0.8102 0.7939 
 
  
54 
The Table (8) shows collected results of running codes for the studied QKD 
protocols. These QKD protocols have been tested by MATLAB, where some of special 
libraries were applied. The main purpose of measuring the efficiency is to compare the 
QKD protocols and determine the usability. Furthermore, each QKD protocol has a specific 
number of the submitted data after the reconciliation phase. For instance, the BB84 
protocol provides a low efficiency as well as the EPR protocol. The failure is reflected by 
using a simplicity of qubit process in the both protocols. On the other hand, the proposed 
QKD and the B92 protocols have assorted as the best outcomes of the efficiency as shown 
in Figure (18).  
 
Figure 22. The QBER Measurements for QKD Protocols before Sifting Phase. 
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Based on the result of QBER during variations of qubits length, the proposed QKD 
protocol fulfills a high percentage of the matched plaintext after applying the sifting phase 
as shown in Figure (18). Although the QBER rises with increasing the length of the 
submitted qubits, the B92 and KMB09 protocols occupied the second better rate, unlike 
the KMB09 protocol that shows increasing in the QBER. The KMB09 utilizes indices of a 
matrix to correct the errors that may happen during exchanging data. 
5.3 The security 
Many experiments on the QKD Protocols were applied, because several concerns 
about security are still active. Some experiments have changed the considerations of the 
classical system. According to many public announcements about the quantum 
cryptography, scientists agreed on that the next generation of cryptography will be the 
quantum cryptography. Moreover, using the law of physics during the exchange of data 
will extend the confidence between the legitimate communicators. In this research, the 
security represents matching between the submitted and received data after the conciliation 
phase. In addition, the security measurement could be applied by several methods, but this 
research utilizes the Shannon Entropy [68, 69] to measure the level of security. 
 
𝐻 = − ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖 log𝑏 𝑃𝑖, (29) 
where Pi is the probability of the shown character (certain qubits) in 𝑖 numbers. 
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Table 9. The security measurements for the QKD protocols (sifting qubits %). 
QKD Protocols 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 Average 
BB84 0.6502 0.6632 0.6918 0.7062 0.6911 0.6834 0.625 0.6730 
B92 0.6373 0.703 0.7618 0.7294 0.7624 0.7452 0.7366 0.7251 
SARG04 0.6467 0.6659 0.7023 0.7059 0.7192 0.7052 0.6948 0.6914 
EPR 0.4939 0.5093 0.5486 0.5302 0.5294 0.51 0.5048 0.5180 
KMB09 0.7129 0.7157 0.7292 0.7198 0.7065 0.7033 0.7003 0.7125 
DPS 0.6039 0.6087 0.6106 0.6043 0.6021 0.5982 0.5977 0.6036 
COW 0.5592 0.5834 0.5903 0.5974 0.6672 0.6803 0.6501 0.6183 
S09 0.6903 0.6911 0.6905 0.6877 0.6735 0.6704 0.6593 0.6804 
S13 0.5899 0.6043 0.6307 0.6461 0.6503 0.6511 0.6499 0.6318 
AK15 0.7008 0.7023 0.7173 0.7392 0.7603 0.7566 0.7511 0.7325 
The result in Table (9) was collected after running each QKD protocol into the 
whole process of algorithm to initiate a secret key. Furthermore, each protocol runs a 
different number of qubits string with applying a noise. Therefore, the result included 
different stages of qubit length, which contain 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, and 2048 qubits.   
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Figure 23. The security measurement for QKD Protocols in different Qubits String length. (from 
32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, and 2048). 
Sequentially, the security of each QKD protocol is calculated based on two factors. 
The first factor of the security is the number of qubits in the plaintext n. The second factor 
is the number of uncovered qubits after passing through the sifting phase, where several 
filtrations are applied.  According to the previous outcomes, the proposed QKD protocol 
could not provide a good result at 32 qubits, but the security rises up as long as the length 
of qubits goes up. This advantage will be observed only in the proposed protocol. For 
instance, the KMB09 protocol gains the best security rate at 32 qubits, but the security 
curve will go down after 128 qubits as shown in Figure (19).  
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5.4 The comparison between the QKD protocols 
To figure out the efficiency of our research, data about all the most well-known 
QKD protocols can be necessary collected. It is also important to dig deeply into each 
protocol although some of those QKD protocols have limited official publications. For 
instance, the S09 was presented to be a protocol closer to the computer science than the 
physics field, but the protocol cannot be used at least in a present day. Later, the S13 was 
presented by the same author of the S09 after 4 years. The S13 came as a modification to 
the last protocol, and the protocol can be now more efficient for using on the existing 
devices.  
In addition, the differentiation of each QKD algorithm creates a great chance to 
build an ideal protocol. Moreover, many QKD protocols have approved a part of 
cryptography, but there are still other uncompleted cryptographic requirements. The 
collected data will exhibit different features that have been used into these QKD protocols. 
The Table (10) will release classical and quantum cryptography techniques and will 
determine the utilized algorithms based on the original protocol.  
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Table 10. The comparison between the studied QKD protocols in physics and cryptographic phases. 
Cases 
Quantum Key Distribution Protocols 
BB84 B92 SARG04 COW KMB09 EPR S09 S13 DPS AK15 
Properties Heisenberg Heisenberg Heisenberg Arbitrary Heisenberg 
Entangleme
nt 
Public 
private key 
Heisenberg Arbitrary Heisenberg 
Number of States 4 states 2 States 4 States Time slots 2 states 
Entangled 2 
of photons 
Arbitrary 
states 
4 states 4 States n-states 
Detection of 
presence 
QBER QBER QBER 
Break of 
coherence 
ITER 
Bell’s 
inequality 
appending 
parity bits 
Random 
Seed 
Time-Slot 
QBER, 
Parity Cell 
Polarization Orthogonal 
Non- 
orthogonal 
Orthogonal Arbitrary Arbitrary Orthogonal 
Bit-Flip 
Phase-Flip 
2 orthogonal DPS Arbitrary 
State Probability Various 50% 50% Calculated 50% Equal Various Various Equal Various 
Qubit String Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete No Discrete Discrete Discrete 
Classical channels Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Decoy States No No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Sifting phase 
Revealing 
Bases 
Alice = 
1 - Bob 
Revealing 
non-orth. 
state 
Revealing 
times 2k+1 
Revealing 
Indices 
Bell's 
Inequality 
No 
Revealing 
Bases 
Time-Slot embedded 
Bell's inequality No No No No No Yes No No No Yes 
PNS attack Vulnerable Vulnerable 
It's better 
than BB84 
Robust Robust N/A N/A N/A Robust Robust 
IRUD attack Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Under Test Under Test Vulnerable N/A N/A N/A N/A 
BS attack Vulnerable Vulnerable Robust Robust Robust Vulnerable N/A N/A Robust Robust 
DoS attack Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable N/A N/A Robust N/A 
MAM attack Vulnerable Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust N/A Robust Robust 
IRA attack Vulnerable Vulnerable Robust Robust Robust 
Bell's 
inequality 
Robust N/A Robust Robust 
Authentication No No No No No No No classic No Quantum 
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The above mentioned comparison of QKD protocols elucidate different 
mechanisms that have been used for creating a secret key [70]. These cryptographic 
mechanisms were extracted from several studied resources. These resources are specific 
data and details based on the original published schemes. Therefore, this research ignored 
any updated algorithms for these QKD protocols after the first modifications. 
5.5 The proposed Protocol Modifications 
According to the proposed scheme that already was explained above, there are some 
modifications to improve the Runtime-Execution as well as the security of this protocol 
against well-known quantum attacks. These adjustments are illustrated in two phases as 
follows: 
5.5.1 The Decoy States 
Using decoy states during the proposed QKD protocol gives more stability and 
trustworthy to the legitimate end users of this protocol. On the other hand, the decoy states 
waste much time based upon the rate of used decoy qubits. To solve this conflict here, the 
upper-triangle of the matrix (or matrices) will be filled in by the plaintext X, but the 
mechanism of filling this triangle will be different.  
Moreover, this scheme utilizes the same previous proposed scheme, but it differs 
in the initiated decoy states in the upper-triangle. The upper-triangle should be filled 
sequentially from up to down by the plaintext with ignoring the diagonal line as explained 
above. Hence, the new modification ignores the decoy states (random states) that should 
be filled in the upper-triangle of the prepared matrix. 
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Figure 24. Inserting quantum states after converting the plaintext X to qubits, and the insertion is 
located at the lower-triangle, upper-triangle, and then diagonal line. 
More precisely, the sender starts filling the lower-triangle from up to down as 
shown in Figure (24). After inserting the qubits in the previous lower-triangle, Alice starts 
filling the upper-triangle, but here should be from down to up. In this case scenario, the 
whole matrix should be filled by the plaintext X except the diagonal line that will be utilized 
as parity cells as shown in Figure (25).  
 
Figure 25. The prepared matrix after filling the upper-triangle, upper-triangle, and the diagonal 
line sequentially by the sender, where each raw should be a total even number after summation. 
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The updated results after the previous modifications for the proposed scheme were 
changed, which the Runtime-Execution is improved as well as the efficiency of the qubit 
submission. The improvements factor occurred by decreasing the required qubits that 
should be prepared by Alice and measured by Bob as shown in the Figure (26). The 
Runtime-Execution also is improved critically, where the proposed protocol was in the 
worst-case scenario during the Runtime-Execution in the previous design as shown in 
Figure (21).  
 
Figure 26. The Runtime-Execution of the proposed QKD protocol after utilizing the last 
modification. 
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Figure 27. The QBER measurement of the proposed QKD protocol after editing the decoy states 
filled into the prepared matrix. 
 
 
Figure 28. The security measurement of the proposed QKD protocol after modifying the 
prepared matrix by Alice. 
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Furthermore, there are two other measurements that were improved based on the 
last update. The efficiency is now better than the previous design, where the rate of 
uncovered 2048 qubits during the quantum communication is around 0.8135 as in Figure 
(27) rather than 0.8102 as in Figure (22). Moreover, the security measurement was changed 
slightly based on the both measurements, where the previous security rate was 0.7511 as 
shown in Figure (23), but the rate of security after the update is 0.7703 as shown in Figure 
(28). This update improves the simplicity of the proposed QKD protocol, where the sender 
and the receiver will not utilize extra qubits accept the parity qubits (diagonal line in the 
matrix). 
5.5.2 The Third Party of Submitting Entangled States 
One of the advantages that may help any communication systems is using a trusted 
third party. This third party will initiate a critical communication information instead of 
the communicating parties. Moreover, the third party will give more confidence to the 
communicating parties as long as both end users need to share information. In this study, 
the third party should be trusted and well-known security provider. The third party also 
should have needed mechanisms to establish any type of communications (availability). 
Hence, the sender will initiate a connection with the well-known third party by providing 
information about the plaintext (prepared matrix). The third party then prepares the 
plaintext MD into a matrix (or matrices if any) and sends a string of the EPR IEPR to both 
parties (Alice and Bob) at the same time as shown in Figure (29) [71]. 
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Figure 29. The Entangled States submitted by third party. 
 
Based on several simulations, the production of the EPR string will not be affected 
either by trusted third party or Alice (the sender). On the other hand, including a third party 
during any communication would increase the Runtime-Execution, which needs an extra 
time to initiate a secret key. In addition, the long-time of any connection spent between the 
legitimate parties causes a high chance to attack the communication many times by 
eavesdroppers. Therefore, the communication with a third party is ignored in this research, 
where the proposed QKD protocol should be initiated between only two participants.   
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSIONS 
The proposed QKD scheme is one of the reliable QKD protocols as well as the most 
secure algorithm. The obtained results in this research show that the proposed QKD 
protocol can stand against most of the well-known quantum attacks. Moreover, the utilized 
mechanism during processing the proposed QKD protocol also has been approved 
successfully in two aspects. The two aspects include two communication channels, where 
each channel carries a specific type of information. Particularly, the first type of 
communication channel in the proposed QKD protocol uses entangled states to configure 
the authentication phase, which has a limited accessibility from any eavesdropper. The 
authentication phase (EPR channel) was framed to transfer limited qubits, and there is no 
exception even if the connection fails. The second aspect is related to transferring qubits 
(plain-text) from the sender to the receiver, whereby this transfer gives a full confidence.  
There is also no interruption that may happen to the submitted data without warning. The 
qubits will be emitted into a quantum channel in a string of sequential qubits. Furthermore, 
the proposed QKD protocol was designed to be convenient for exchanging a huge data, 
where inserting data into a matrix (or matrices) is required by both legitimate parties.  
The legitimate communicators should sort the inputs and outputs of data during the 
EPR channel through a logical movement of information. The logical movement should be 
a process that is used by either the sender or receiver. In addition, both the sender and 
receiver should collect data in certain polarization methods with specific measuring tools. 
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In other words, the designed mechanism of the proposed QKD protocol focuses on 
fulfilling the authentication between the end users, where the EPR communication must be 
simulated and approved before exchanging any valuable data. Providing an authentication 
at the beginning of any communication gives a high percentage of trust to both legitimate 
parties. Furthermore, the data of the plain-text should be transferred to whom is well-
known as a sender or receiver without any doubt. As a result, the proposed QKD protocol 
has been evaluated in different security modes with some security methods of the well-
known QKD protocols. The outcomes also have brought the proposed QKD protocol to the 
top of security strategies if not the first one with some QKD protocols. The novelty of this 
QKD protocol is included when approving an authenticated system before exchanging any 
data between the end users. The encryption and decryption codes will be extracted by using 
a secure channel (entangled states) in short time of processing. At the end, the QKD 
protocol provides an authentication between any end users, and the quantum mechanics 
roles will be utilized during transferring a data.  
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